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WILLIAM R.Uncertainty and the
Distribution of
Earnings
LINKS BETWEEN UNCERTAINTY THEORY AND
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
Thelanguage of uncertainty theory is familiar to the student of the
distribution of income. The same functions which are used by probability
theorists to describe outcomes of stochastic events are also used to
describe the observed distribution of income or earnings; the normal, the
log-normal, and the Pareto distributions are the most familiar examples.
It is not necessarily true, however, that the use of these functions to
describe the distribution of income implies that income itself is a
stochastic variable whose behavior is subject to laws of chance like a
roulette wheel. Indeed, many theories of the distribution of income
employ functions usually associated with probability densities to describe
deterministic models of the distribution of income. LydalI (1968), for
example, proposes an entirely deterministic model of income distribution
at the upper tail of the distribution which yields the Pareto function.
Others have attempted to construct theories which transform symmetri-
cally distributedabilities into the asymmetric, skewed pattern of
observed incomes. The hallmark of these theories is that, given an
individual's characteristics, his income is entirely determined except
possibly for some small error term.
NOTE:The author is a graduate student at the University of Virginia.
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Whiledeterministic models of the income distribution borrow the
mathematical functions of probability theory, stochastic theories make
income itself, to some extent, a chance event or a stochastic variable. The
form of the income distribution in these models depends in part on the
probability density function of the stochastic elements of income. One
such stochastic theory of the income distribution is that of Champer-
nowne (1953), in which income this period depends on income last period
in a probabilistic way. Champernowne shows that this Markovian process
can ultimately yield a Paretian disüibution of incomes, regardless of the
initial distribution of income. These results were extended by Mandeibrot
(1961).
Milton Friedman has also advanced a stochastic model of income
determination (1953). In this case, however, it is not time-dependent
stochastic processes which are the key to the model but the year-to-year
variation of transitory income around permanent income, which was later
to play a central role in Friedman's theory of the consumption function.
Friedman was probably overly impressed with the annual variation in
incomes as a result of his earlier studies of the income of professionals in
independent practice, a group whose incomes probably vary more than
the average (Friedman and Kuznets, 1945). The apparent great uncer-
tainty of annual incomes led Friedman to emphasize the fact that the
inequality of annual incomes is greater than the inequality of permanent
lifetime incomes and, by extension, the distribution of utility. Friedman
went farther than this in his discussion of uncertainty; he brought out the
role of risk in the choice of occupation. That is, some individuals choose
occupations in which the dispersion of incomes is greater than in other
occupations. Chance would govern their permanent incomes as well as
annual incomes. However, by emphasizing the role of choice as well as
chance in the process (since an individual selects among different lines of
work), Friedman again cautioned against interpreting income inequality
as reflecting inequality of, in this case, expected utility. In part, the
distribution of income is unequal because some individuals make risky
choices and earn income with varying degrees of success.
Recent empirical studies are beginning to echo Friedman's appeal to
uncertainty in explaining income inequality. Jencks (1972), especially,
finds that none of the familiar determinants of earnings—demographic
characteristics, family background, schooling, cognitive ability—explain
more than a small fraction of the observed inequality of income in the
United States. Jencks ascribes some of the unexplained variance to
random factors: "In general, we think that luck has far more influence on
income than successful people admit" (1972, p. 227). Although Jencks's
results are open to serious question because of his peculiar model and the
heterogeneity of his data sources, his inability to explain much of the
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dispersion in earnings has been duplicated by other studies. Recent work
using microdata files has failed to explain more than a small fraction of the
total variance in individual earnings. For example, Taubman and Wales's
recent work with the extremely rich Thorndike-Hagan file of veterans
emphasizes the failure of deterministic models to explain much income
inequality (Taubman and Wales, 1973). Their earnings function, which
included not only traditional demographic variables, but also extensive
measures of ability taken from armed forces test results, and family
background variables, had R2's of around .10. Recent work by Paul
Taubman (reported in this volume) extends the Taubman-Wales results
and raises the explained variance of earnings to more than 40 percent.
Hall (1973) estimated wage equations for race-sex groups from Survey of
Economic Opportunity data and found standard errors of estimate for his
equations of nearly forty cents per hour. These results indicate that
earnings are hard to predict; there seems to be a good deal of indetermi-
nacy in earnings.
Taubman and Wales performed an experiment which sheds light on the
structure of uncertainty in earnings. In their estimate of 1969 earnings,
they used as an explanatory variable the error from their equation
estimating earnings in 1955 for the individual. In this way, any perma-
nent, yet unobserved, explanation of earnings in 1955 would help to
explain earnings in 1969. Interestingly, the inclusion of these residuals
raised the R2 from .10 to .33, indicating that these permanent unobserved
factors account for close to one-quarter of the variance in incomes
(Taubman and Wales, 1973, p. 37). As for the rest of the variance in
incomes, Taubman and Wales concluded that "... two-thirdsof the
variation in earnings in any year represents either random events such as
luck, and/or changes in underlying characteristics" (1973, p. 38).
TYPESOF UNCERTAINTY IN INCOMES
Uncertaintynot only plays a role in several theories of the distribution of
income, but it appears that empirical estimates confirm the existence of a
large amount of uncertainty or unexplained variance in the estimation of
earnings. To the extent that uncertainty plays a role in the determination
of earnings, the probability density functions of the stochastic terms of the
earnings function determine, in part, the shape of the distribution of
earnings. The stochastic elements in earnings are of two basic types. The
first is the year-to-year variability in earnings which led Friedman to
distinguish between observed income and permanent income. The
importance of this short-run variability has been discounted by Thurow
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whosays: "The distribution of lifetime incomes probably looks very
similar to the distribution of annual incomes" (1969, p. 108). There is,
however, another facet of uncertainty which transcends the year-to-year
variations—unexplained permanent dispersion in incomes. The per-
manent uncertainty is clearly one key to the inequality of lifetime incomes
among individuals and is, therefore, the focus of this paper.
CAUSESOF UNEXPLAINED PERMANENT
DISPERSION IN EARNINGS
Whataccounts for this unexplained permanent variation in earnings?
Certainly, some of the explanation rests with actual differences in
individuals which are not, or cannot be, observed by the statistician.
Although the Taubman and Wales data encompassed a broad range of
explanatory variables, there are undoubtedly unmeasured differences in
personality, motivation, and ability which create real differences in
individual productivities. In this case, apparent uncertainty in incomes is
due not to stochastic variables in the earnings function but to unobserved
differences in characteristics. That is, firms pay wages which reflect
marginal products and recognize differences in productivity among
individuals; however, outside observers cannot recognize or measure all
of the factors which affect an individual's productivity. These unobserved
components clearly look like earnings uncertainty to the outside observer
and they may be just as uncertain a priori to the individual himself. A
person may not be aware, in advance, of all of the factors which affect his
productivity and, to this extent, unobserved components are uncertain to
him, too.
Another source of differences in earnings of equivalent
persons are compensating wage differentials for nonmonetary aspects of
jobs. In other words, part of earnings may be payments for job charac-
teristics rather than for personal characteristics. Lucas in an empirical
investigation of job characteristics finds rather perverse results; many
characteristics of jobs which are usually considered to be unpleasant are
rewarded negatively rather than positively ceteris paribus (Thurow and
Lucas, 1972). Greg Duncan (in this volume) studies the impact of fringe
benefits in reducing wage differentials.
A third reason for unexplained differences in earnings is one which has
been emphasized recently in another context—costly information and
imperfect markets. This rubric embraces two principal hindrances to
perfectly competitive labor markets—first, the institutional forces of
unions and industrial structure which prevent the achievement of perfect
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competition; and second, the costs of acquiring information both for the
worker and for his (potential) employer, and the related costs of mobility
between occupations and geographic locations. To the extent that
information is imperfect and mobility is costly, then differences in
earnings of persons with exactly the same productivity will not be
eliminated. An estimated earnings function would not be able to explain
all the variance in earnings even if we could measure every characteristic
which affects an individual's productivity.
THISPAPER
Thedispersion of permanent lifetime incomes among observationally
equivalent persons can be ascribed either to unobserved differences in
personal characteristics which affect an individual's productivity or to
imperfections in labor markets which allow equally productive individu-
als to be paid different amounts. The subject of this paper is not the cause
of uncertainty in earnings but rather the effect of uncertainty on the wage
structure itself. The principal focus is on differences in uncertainty across
occupations: Is there a tradeoff between risk and return in occupational
earnings? The importance of this question as regards the distribution of
income is at least twofold. First,if average earnings are higher in
occupations which have greater unexplained variance in earnings (and
therefore less certain earnings to the potential entrant to the occupation),
then the market is compensating for uncertainty, and the distribution of
expected utility is likely to be less unequal than the distribution of
observed incomes. Second, the positive correlation of dispersion with
average earnings provides an explanation for the observed skewness in
the distribution of labor incomes.
In the rest of this paper, the tradeoff between risk and return in the
labor market is estimated, using data from the 1970 Census. In order to
estimate uncertainty, an earnings function is specified. Because many
significant variables cannot be observed, estimates of uncertainty are
necessarily biased. The effect of this bias on the results is considered.
Results for different demographic groups indicate that the risk-return
relation exists and seems to be related to the degree of occupational
immobility in the demographic group.
ASIMPLE MODEL OF EARNINGS
Considera simple linear model of permanent, lifetime earnings. Inter-
temporal variation of earnings is not important here, only the dispersion
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ofearnings across individuals. Let
(1)
where
Yqisthe permanent earnings of individual fin occupation i;
a,is a parameter (scalar);
Z,isa vector of observed characteristics of individual j;
A is a vector of unobserved characteristics of individual /;
& are parameter vectors conformable toA,; and
is the stochastic element of earnings for individual / in occupation i.
Assume thatis distributed identically for all individuals in occupa-
tion i, although clearly the valuetakes on may be different for each
person. The expected value ofis zero. An individual's earnings in
occupation i are determined by his characteristics,and A,, the reward
occupation i puts on these characteristics, and a chance element, Xi,. This
stochastic term is permanent for the individual—his one draw from the
distribution determines his earnings in the occupation forever.
In an econometric earnings function, both A, and X1, are pushed into
the error term of the equation. They must be separated, at least
conceptually, because the unobserved characteristics, A,, may be known
by the individual choosing an occupation, whereas X1, cannot be known,
by definition. Inability to observe A will introduce bias into the estimates
of uncertainty; unexplained variance in earnings for individuals with the
same Z, could arise from either X1, or differences in A,.
Given the earnings function of (1), an individual is assumed to
maximize his lifetime expected utility by choosing the appropriate
occupation. For an individual with a given set of attributes, Z, and A,, the
choice is made on the basis of the &, and the distribution of X,1 for
each occupation. Clearly, no person actually knows a,, /3,, and 8,; what
they may know is mean earnings in occupation i for individuals with
similar characteristics, and an impression of the dispersion of earnings
around the mean. In fact, Freeman (1971) finds that college students are
quite well informed about the pattern of earnings in various occupations.
By maximizing expected utility in choosing an occupation, persons will be
basing their choice both on mean earnings and the uncertainty, or
dispersion, of earnings. Analogous to financial theory, equilibrium in the
labor market should involve a tradeoff between risk and return across
occupations for given demographic groups. Occupations with a great deal
of uncertainty must offer greater than average wages in order to entice
entrants. One of the key assumptions here is the lack of mobility between
occupations. To the extent that individuals move between occupations,
the risk-return relationship is mitigated; a person who fares poorly in one
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occupation will move to another. In reality, given the costs of mobility
(including the training costs for the new occupation), there is an
optimal pattern of occupational "search," similar to the job search
process described by Mortensen (1970). It suffices to assert that the more
mobility between occupations, the weaker the relationship between risk
and return.
THEDATA
Earningsdistributions for full-time workers broken down by race, age,
sex, education and occupation are given in the 1970 Census. Each
distribution gives the dispersion of full-time earnings for individuals in a
given age, sex, race, and education group for a particular occupation. By
comparing mean earnings and dispersion across occupations, within a
given demographic group, the contribution of Z1 to earnings does not
have to be explicitly estimated. For the time being, we assume that all
individuals in a particular demographic group (same Z's) have the same
unobserved characteristics, A. I shall later investigate the bias introduced
into our estimates by such an assumption.
FUNCTIONALFORM
Inorder to specify a functional form for estimation, both a utility function
and a distribution function for X41 must be postulated. The traditional use
of mean and variance is not necessarily appropriate; recent work in the
theory of uncertainty shows that the mean-variance criteria can be
inconsistent with the expected utility hypothesis (see Feldstein [1969]). A
convenient hypothesis is that earnings and the stochastic term follow a
log-normal distribution, whereas the utility function is of the constant
relative risk aversion type. Then, expected utility can be expressed as a
linear function of the log of the mean of income and the variance (see
Weiss [1972]). On the other hand, if earnings are normally distributed,
then utility can be written as a simple function of mean and variance. In
this study, many different functional forms were tried.
Since the distribution data come grouped into rather large income
classes, the data were fitted to both the normal and the log-normal
distributionsinordertoestimateparametersoftheearnings
distributions.1 Otherwise, the error in estimating variances directly from
grouped data would be large, especially with the open-ended highest
Uncertaintyand the Distribution of Earnings 385income bracket. Then, the estimated parameters of these normal and
log-normal approximations were used to estimate risk-return relation-
ships. The dependent variable in each estimated equation was either the
mean earnings in the occupation for the particular demographic group, as
computed by the Census Bureau, or the log of that mean.
RESULTS
Theresults cannot be easily summarized. No one specification was clearly
superior for all 36 demographic groups (2 race groups, 3 age groups and 6
education groups). Neither the normal nor the log-normal approximation
to the distribution of earnings was clearly superior for all demographic
groups, by a chi-squared test of goodness of fit, so both were used. For
every demographic group, the estimated coefficient on the dispersion
variable, the standard deviation of earnings, was positive. Even when the
coefficient of variation was used as the dispersion variable, the results
were positive when earnings were fitted to the log-normal distribution.
As an example of the results, Table 1 gives the results for all demographic
groups for one of the estimated equations. Results for blacks were less
definite because earnings distributions were available for fewer occupa-
tions.
Because the estimated coefficient on the dispersion variable was
positive in virtually every case, it appears that one can say with a fair
degree of assurance that uncertainty is compensated to some degree in
the labor market. However, at least two caveats should be appended to
this assertion. First, the measure of uncertainty used, dispersion of 1969
full-time earnings, does not necessarily represent the permanent disper-
sion of earnings. To the extent that annual earnings fluctuate around
permanent earnings, this measure of dispersion overstates the permanent
dispersion in earnings. Only a longitudinal sample could reveal the extent
of transitory variation in incomes. Friedman and Kuznets's data for
independent professional incomes are probably not representative
(Friedman and Kuznets, 1945). A second qualification to the results is
that the risk of unemployment seems to exert a negative influence on
relative occupational earnings in many of the samples. This influence is
measured by the variable FULLEMP, which is high when the risk of
unemployment or part-time work is low. Thus, the market does not seem
to compensate for the risk of unemployment undertaken in a given
occupation, a relationship Hall (1970) has suggested for geographic
areas.2 Because we have used cross-sectional data from a generally low
unemployment year (1969), we have certainly not measured adequately
the effect of cyclical unemployment on average occupational earnings.
386 JohnsonTABLE 1Regression Results: Effect of Earnings Dispersion on
Mean Earnings across Occupations for Various
Demographic Groups







Male Whites, Aged 25—34
0—8 55 6,299 9.856 .7141 —1,016 .254
(1.344) (2.003) (3.397) (.2233)
9—11 84 3,100 8.348 .3708 4,163 .178
(1.364) (3.007) (3.007) (1.843)
12 101 —1,633 8.625 1.048 7,110 .245
(.470) (3.734) (4.365) (1.962)
13—15 100 18,357 7.728 .6269 —10,273 .400
(6.985) (3.184) (3.768) (3.902)
16 90 11,829 7.409 .5332 —2,695 .133
(2.863) (1.856) (1.943) (.6864)
17+ 73 201 3.908 1.111 6,733 .156
(2.857) (.8189) (3.847) (4.989)
Male Whites, Aged 35—54
0—8 83 8,601 12.05 .6224 —1,945 .293
(2.893) (3.076) (3.151) (.6711)
9—11 96 14,792 12.969 1.144 —8,590 .309
(2.361) (3.117) (4.631) (1.3471)
12 107 14,523 14.95 1.689 —9,970 .535
(3.158) (4.507) (8.261) (2.267)
13—15 103 28,681 14.108 1.837 —23,722 .708
(5.317) (4.643) (12.04) (4.606)
16 94 331.5 11.085 1.923 4,086 .573
(5.075) (2.489) (10.615) (4.450)
17+ 79 569.2 4.856 2.044 4,452 .533
(7.322) (.661) (8.814) (3.132)
Male Whites, Aged 55—65
0—8 77 1,634 20.07 .3981 5,268 .238
(.8418) (4.278) (1.580) (2.662)
9—11 83 3,344 21.79 .4137 4,236 .268
(1.691) (4.672) (1.990) (2.073)
12 95 283.6 25.55 1.462 4,104 .422
(3.656) (4.206) (7.217) (4.705)






Male Whites, Aged 55—65 (continued)
13—15 86 18,509 18.93 1.110 —11,713 .482
(3.880) (3.829) (5.734) (2.518)
16 71 264 20.74 1.706 5,391 .378
(4.123) (2.950) (6.261) (3.690)
17+ 56 35,984 10.951 .861 —22,858 .250
(2.106) (1.044) (3.043) (1.431)
Male Blacks, Aged 25—34
0—8 19 —31.71 15.50 .2187 4,403 .589
(1.3203) (2.828) (2.196) (13.55)
9—11 24 .748 18.795 .511 4,348 .727
(.0211) (6.345) (1.950) (5.609)
12 30 7,174 7.120 .755 —2,267 .383
(1.532) (1.857) (2.377) (9.518)
13—15 23 6,867 4.671 —.148 1,517
(.986) (.922) (.2753) (.2443)
16 11 —6,818 1.949 .952 12,294
(.798) (.1332) (.9377) (1.692)
17+ 6 23,333 —12.30 —.1138 —9,508
(.728) (.423) (.05 1) (.2704)
Male Blacks, Aged 35—54
0—8 25 5,665 14.84 .297 —890 .288
(1.232) (2.609) (1.549) (.207)
9—11 28 8,975 17.36 —.007 —2,006 .322
(1.687) (2.504) (.0369) (.422)
12 34 26,451 11.428 .1225 —18,254 .558
(4.385) (2.204) (.8717) (3.165)
13—15 26 28.23 7.184 .1208 7,533
(.205) (1.105) (.340) (5.883)
16 15 278.9 9.179 1.372 3,939 .615
(4.952) (.945) (3.237) (2.448)
17+ 10 40,331 —2.363 2.512 37,565
(2.231) (.2337) (6.728) (2.393)
Male Blacks, Aged 55—64
0—8 19 6,037 6.696 .5212 —1,873 .463
(1.828) (1.075) (2.967) (.602)




































SOURCE:1970 Census of Population PC(2)-8B, Earningsby Occupation and Education.
aFULLEMPis the ratio of average earnings of all workers to average earnings of full-year workers. A high figure
indicates little part-time work or unemployment.
bGR!511fl.j is the rate of growth of the occupation from 1960 to 1970.
Cstandard deviation is the standard deviation of earnings, under the normal approximation.
Anindication of the economic significance of the results displayed in
Table 1 is given in Table 2, which presents the dollar impact on mean
wages of a change in the dispersion variable of one standard deviation.
Clearly, not only are the results statistically significant, but they are also
economically significant, with dollar effects ranging from $277 to $4,124.
UNCERTAINTY AND IMMOBILITY
As mentioned above, the risk-return tradeoff should have a steeper slope,
the less mobility there is between occupations. When persons are locked
into their choices of occupations, then there is no opportunity for an ex
post. equalizing movement between occupations. Dispersion in earnings
can exist under such circumstances. If, on the other hand, mobility is
perfect between occupations, then there should be no differences in
earnings among occupations which do not stem from differences in
individual characteristics or nonpecuniary factors. Another way to see
this is to consider that with perfect mobility, there is no penalty for
choosing a highly risky occupation, because one can leave costlessly if
one's luck is bad.
Interestingly, the data do support a tentative conclusion that immobil-
ity may be related to the strength of the tradeoff between risk and return.
Figure1presents data on mobility between broad occupational
classes—broader, in fact, than the units of observation for the risk-return
equations. The data are grouped to correspond most closely with the
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ITABLE 2Dollar Effects of Mean
Occupational Earnings of a One
Standard Deviation Change in the
Dispersion Variable: Equation


























groupings of our estimated equations. As expected, immobility rises
sharply from the 20—34 to the 35—49agegroup and slightly beyond that.
Immobility also rises with education in the two older age groups, while it
tends to fall with education in the lowest age group. It is well to caution
that these results may be peculiar because of the breadth of occupational
classes involved in the definition of mobility.
In Figure 2, the estimated coefficients on the dispersion term (standard
deviation of earnings) are plotted for the equation whose complete
results appear in Table 1. In fact, the coefficients seem to behave quite
like the measures of immobility in Figure 1. For the middle age group,
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FIGURE 1Immobility: Proportion of
Individuals in 1970 with Same
Major Occupation as 1965; by
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17+there is not such a clear pattern. While it is probably incorrect to make too
much of this similarity, the evidence does point both to a positive
relationship between risk and return in the labor market and to an
association of the goodness of fit or strength of this relationship and
occupational immobility. The robustness of these conclusions is under-
scored by the large number of demographic groups and functional forms
used in making the estimates.
THEPROBLEM OF OMITTED VARIABLES
Sofar, the observed association between the dispersion of earnings and
mean earnings across occupations, but within demographic groups, has
been attributed to the tradeoff between risk and return in the labor
market. In this section of the paper, another explanation for these results
is considered—the omission of ability as a variable.
The bias introduced by the omission of A, or ability from the estimates
causes two kinds of error: first, the measured dispersion of the random
term, X11, for an occupation includes the dispersion of A in addition to the
true dispersion of second, the effect of differences in mean ability
across occupations is omitted from the equation explaining differences in
mean earnings across occupations. In the mean-variance framework (to






ismeanearnings in occupation i;
(varX), is thevarianceof "true"inoccupation i;
A, is the mean ability of individuals in occupation i; and
K, y,and/3 are parameters.
The coefficient y is the payment for risk which we are trying to estimate.
Notethat weinitially assume that occupations reward ability identically,
that f3 is the same for all i.
Instead of estimating this "true" relation, we estimate
(3) 1'=k+g[est (var
where est (var X), is the measured variance of earnings within occupation
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Ii. The purpose of this analysis is to discover the extent to which the
estimated parameters, kandg, differ from the true parameters, K and y.
The measured variance of earnings, est (var X)1, can be written
(4) est (var )ö,= (varY) =(var +f32(varA)1
where (var A), is the variance of A within occupation I and is
independent of A. Considering only large-sample properties of the
estimate,
coy {(Y), est (var A')1]
phmg=
(var Y,)





j3 coy [A1, (varA')j]+/32 (varA),]+f33 cov[A1, (varA),]
+ (var
If abilities are randomly distributed among occupations, then all the
covariance terms will be zero in the probability limit, and var A1, the
variance of average ability across occupations, is zero. In this case, there is
no bias because plim g =y.In fact, these are reasonable assumptions,
given the assumptions of the model (there is no reason to expect any
particular pattern of abilities across occupations if /3 is the same for each
occupation), so that in the probability limit, abilities should be identically
distributed across occupations.







Again, the first and second covariance terms are zero in the probability
limit, but the third will be positive even if A and (var A), are not




If individuals do not know their abilities and are therefore choosing
occupations regardless of /3,, then there may again be random assortment
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of abilities to occupations. In this case, A, and (var A), will again be
constant, in the probability limit, across occupations. Thus, var f31A1 will
equal A, varf,>0 and var(A),]willdepend on
coy ((3k,(n). Thenet distortionary effect will be indeterminate because
var decreases g while coy A)1] increases the estimate.
Curiously, if individuals do know their abilities and f3, the distortion
becomes less positive. In this case, high ability individuals will choose
occupations which reward ability highly, so that coyA.) >0, and
therefore, var >A1 var (a,)>0.The denominator of the first term
of (7) is larger and the bias becomes less positive. In fact, if the covariance
term in (7) were zero, then the estimate g would underestimate y. In fact,
however, coy [ f3A1, A),] will be positive even if A, and (var A)1
are constant over i, because f3is positively correlated with
Although there is no evidence onthere is some evidence that
coy [A1, (var A)1] may be negative. Data gathered during World War II
which matched civilian occupations of military men with scores on armed
forces tests show that, as expected, people in higher status or higher
income occupations tend to perform better on tests (Harrell and Harrell,
1945). However, the variance of ability within an occupation, as meas-
ured by test scores, tends to decrease as the average ability of the
occupation increases. This result may be explained by the assumption of a
minimum level of ability which differs from occupation to occupation.
Occupations with higher standards will have higher average abilities and,
because a smaller range of abilities is acceptable, a smaller ability
variance. Under these circumstances, coy [f31A1, A)1] will be smal-
ler than it would be if A and (var A), were the same for all i, but still may
be either positive or negative. Thus, one cannot say for sure whether it
will be overestimated or underestimated, but at least there is no definite
positive bias.
CONCLUSION
Inthis paper, a stochastic model of earnings was used to derive estimable
relations between risk and return in the labor market. The estimates
reveal a systematic positive effect of earnings dispersion on average
earnings. This result holds up for many different demographic groups,
and for both the normal and log-normal approximations to the distribu-
tion of earnings. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients for the disper-
sion term are larger for demographic groups which are less mobile
between occupations, conforming to theoretical expectations. Finally,
the omission of certain key variables, while a problem, may not be a
serious source of bias in the estimates.
Johnson
-There are two implications of these findings for the distribution of
income. First, since the market compensates for risk, in the form of
earnings uncertainty, the distribution of expected utility is less unequal
than the distribution of incomes. However, the reverse is true if the risk of
unemployment is considered. Second, if the variance of earnings around
an occupational mean is positively related to the occupational mean, then
there is a "real" explanation for the rightward skewness in the distribu-
tion of earnings. Consider the third moment of the distribution, a
traditional measure of skewness
where, as before, i indexes occupations, /indexesindividuali If earnings
within an occupation are not skewed around the occupational mean, and
the means themselves are not skewed around the population mean, then
where (var 1') is the variance of earnings within occupation iandY is the
population mean. Clearly, the size of S depends on the positive correla-
tion between (var Y)1 and V1.
NOTES
1.The normal and log-normal approximations were based on a procedure in Aitchison
and Brown (1957).
2.Another variable, GRWTH, the percentage change in employment in the occupation,
1960—70, was a proxy for changing demand. As expected, its coefficients were positive
and significant. The age-earnings profiles were tried as variables but were not
significant.
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